Social Movements in the Arab World
Azza Abd al-Mohsen Khalil, 5 Juillet, 2004 - 06:27.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that neo-liberalism often represents an overt encroachment on the interests of broad segments of the population, especially the most impoverished and marginalized in the global order. This raises the question of whether this encroachment positively or adversely affects the ability of these populations to resist and defend their interests. Today, the majority of the population in the Arab world is subjected to increasing pressures on the economic, social, political, and cultural fronts, and the social context does not allow these groups a space from which to effectively defend themselves. Thus, a careful examination of social movements in Arab societies is imperative. Such an inquiry would initially seek to define the characteristics acquired by social movements as the social structure in the Arab world evolved. This necessitates focusing on the emergence of these movements, their modes of expression, the dynamics of their interactions with their environment, the prospects they offer for change, the potential of these movements, and the extent to which they are influenced by external, global conditions. These questions are the focus of the present endeavor.*
This study is divided into three parts. The first addresses the evolution of social movements within the social structure of Arab societies. The second part focuses on the social, economic, and political background against which these movements operate. The third part, the major section of the study, is largely concerned with surveying the most active social movements in the region. The conclusion discusses the potential of social movements and the challenges they face in resisting neo-liberalism.

On the concept of social movements
In defining social movements, we have avoided using categories derived from contexts that differ significantly from those of Arab societies, in order to find a model reconcilable with the theoretical and political context of this study. The absence of social movements identical to those found in the European or Latin American experience does not necessarily imply the absence of any form of social movement in the region. Using this approach, we can define our objective as an attempt to understand the domestic forces and interactions in Arab societies that seek to influence the present and shape the future, and to examine the self-regulating mechanisms employed by various social movements irrespective of the form these mechanisms take. Similarly, we shall attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of those movements working to achieve independence from the state, which is the key to understanding the democratic struggle against neo-liberalism and possible alternatives to it. To summarize, we are concerned with understanding concrete social interactions.
Using this definition of social movements, the following fall within the ambit of our inquiry:
1. New social movements, which refer to those movements which are concerned with general social objectives that transcend the limits of class and political structure, as well as old movements, which refer to movements based on a specific identity—class or geographic—that engage in relations with the political structure.
2. As far as the political and social dimensions of social movements are concerned, we distinguish between social movements and political parties. Whereas social movements may seek to influence decision-making or make demands of the state, they do not seek to accumulate political power, nor do they operate through direct political channels as do parties. Rather, they seek a distinct form of social power. In addition, social movements are primarily concerned with social issues, although these may have indirect political implications.
3. Regarding the relationship between social movements and their particular and general environment, and the impact this has on their strategies for change, such movements do not necessarily need a working agenda that reflects a blueprint for political rule. They must, however, have a certain degree of self-awareness and a defined identity that provide the framework for their attempts at social change, in addition to a symbolic, ideological value system and a legitimate popular base. Furthermore, social movements as defined here work to maintain their independence and are self-sustaining. At the same time, social movements participate in creating a different political, social and cultural climate and they provoke conflicts on the political, intellectual, social, and economic levels, particularly in the public sphere. Such movements may operate strictly on the local level. That is, they do not necessarily have a national orientation.
4. Insofar as the popular or elite nature of the movement is concerned, we believe that grassroots movements are one type of social movement, though not the only type. Moreover, given the narrow space within which grassroots movements operate in the region, it is necessary to understand elitist movements, examining their positions towards different social groups and the role of the latter in shaping elitist movements’ vision of change.
5. Regarding organizational structures, all movements must have leaders that are distinguishable from the base, in addition to the mechanisms required to mobilize material and moral resources. This differs significantly from a spontaneous uprising lacking self-awareness and structure. Since every organization is not necessarily a social movement, we shall discount developmental organizations as well as service-delivery and charitable organizations that do not make social demands through which they seek to change the current state of affairs. For such organizations, the status quo is not problematic, and in fact, they constitute the majority of the thousands of NGOs and local associations in the Arab world (Samir Amin, 2003). Furthermore, although social movements tend to distance themselves from well-organized, rigidly hierarchical institutions with a stable membership, this sort of organizational structural does exist in some movements.
6. As for the continuity and size of social movements, we must remember that social movements go through phases of intensive activity followed by relative calm. Moreover, for the purposes of this study, we will not be restricted to major movements. In any case, definitions of size tend to vary: some consider the mere mobilization of dozens of people a movement, while hundreds of people constitute a strong movement (Andre Gunder Frank, 149; Mohsen Marzouk; Mahmoud Memdani; Caesar Fernandez, 40, 426; Alan Scott, 17-37).
7. Our definition of anti-globalization social movements refers to those movements whose objective is to push societies away from neo-liberal policies or defend certain social groups that have been devastated by neo-liberal policies. It is not necessary for the resistance to have a comprehensive understanding of these policies or a clearly defined strategy for resisting them. This is only available to a well-organized political force, which is not considered a social movement.

The development of the social structure and the evolution of social movements in the Arab world
Throughout different historical periods, the Arab region has experienced various forms of stable, centralized authority. The central authority appropriated the economic surplus through a multi-level hierarchical system that granted various social levels their share of the surplus in return for their allegiance to highest authority, generally an individual. This essentially patriarchal system, maintained through a network of patron-client relations with local leaders, exhausted the surplus, aborted the growth of nascent productive social formations (peasants, artisans, and merchants), and inhibited creativity and innovation by encouraging the pursuit of capital accumulation in the form of gold. It led to the suppression of political expression, the spread of corruption, and a lack of security in both rural and urban regions alike (Abdullan Hannah).
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed movements by urban masses against exploitation and the deterioration of living standards under Ottoman rule. These include the Aleppo movements, which saw the seizure of the city by the common population and the flight of the local governor in 1818, followed by the siege and bombardment of the city in 1821. They also include the Aleppo uprising against British conscription and the real estate tax in 1851 and the July 1832 revolution in Damascus, in which the local ruler was besieged in his citadel for forty days, then murdered along with his entourage. The Levant also witnessed several peasant uprisings against the excessive taxation, the administrative system, and local sheikhs and feudal lords (Adullah Hannah).
In Egypt a major uprising broke out in 1895 with the increase of taxes. Prior to that, Cairo witnessed its first revolution in 1798 followed by another in March 1800, both largely directed against the French invasion, but also as expression of popular outrage over the standards of living and resentment towards the local governors and the Mamluks. The end of the French expedition heralded the emergence of several mass uprisings against the Mamluks and city governors in large demonstrations—which included women—that marched on the Citadel to make popular demands of the governor. Such movements continued until Mohamed Ali rose to power in 1805, supported by popular and religious forces. Tunisia also experienced such movements in the Awlad Aziz rebellion of 1845 and the 1864 uprising against taxes and the preferential treatment of foreigners (in the latter the rebels presented their grievances against the ruler to the Ottoman sultan) (Abdullah Hannah, Abdel Aziz El-Shenawy).
All these movements were short-lived and largely consisted of marginalized populations rising against an arbitrary ruler and a general state of impoverishment. Due to the relatively low level of productive development, the weakness of these social formations, and their weakness vis-à-vis the political authority to which they turned to safeguard their economic interests—economic patriarchy, if you will—the leaders of such movements (usually the clergy) were willing to negotiate with the authority. Indeed, in some cases they played the role of intermediary, whose political power was determined by the political authority, which either accepted or rejected this intermediary role (Abdullah Hannah, 53-48; Abd El-Aziz El-Shenawy). Most of these uprisings were directed against the local authority and never evolved into a real confrontation with the central power in Istanbul. The center was always represented by the Sublime Porte, which exercised its authority in the name of Islam, which in turn legitimized the patriarchal system. Thus, the prevalent culture, entrenched by religious leaders, played a paramount role in aborting the outcome of popular movements (Abd El-Aziz El-Shenawy).
The French campaign demonstrated the weakness of the socioeconomic system of the Ottoman Empire, particularly its ability to resist European imperialism. In response, the Ottoman Empire instituted a series of reforms that came to be known as the Tanzimat. These were top-down reforms instituted by the central authority to delegitimize despotism, but they paved the way for new forms of despotism. This set the stage for the emergence of capitalistic relationships, the modernization of the bourgeoisie, and a new level of European intervention (Hesham Sharaby, 75). At the same time, similar developments were taking place all over the Arab world, such as the Khayer El-Din El-Tunisi movement in Tunisia, Dawoud Pasha and Medhat Pasha in Iraq, and Mohamed Ali’s attempts to create a modern state in Egypt (Abdullah Hannah).
The Arab elite of the late nineteenth century was composed of the ruling elite (whether of tribal, aristocratic, local, or Turkish origins), large landowners (who emerged as a result of the enactment of the 1858 Land Law that allowed the registration of private land), large merchants, civil servants, and wealthy, influential families. Families affiliated with religious institutions were in charge of the waqfs and monopolized the educational and judicial systems. This class supported Ottoman rule, resisted calls for progress and openness to Western civilization, and hindered innovation. This was also the case with military and quasi-military families, as well as grain and livestock merchants. Commercial families (who were more connected with the local market and production), small entrepreneurs, artisans, and the educated, new middle class supported the movement for reform (Abdullah Hannah, 58-59). Their aspirations were circumscribed by the space allowed by the regime, and they were not often able to exceed these boundaries. Modernization attempts that focused on upgrading services like education, health care, and transportation were marked by vivid accomplishments, while those that were concerned with expanding the sphere of power and limiting centralization faced ferocious resistance and were doomed to failure (as is the case with Orabi’s movement).
The major current of reformist and renaissance thought was concentrated in the new middle class. The contradictions that allowed the emergence of capitalism and modernity in European societies did not exist in Arab societies. Accordingly, modernist ideas did not spontaneously emerge in Arab societies (Samir Amin, 2003). The proponents of modernity endorsed the imitation of the Western model, to which they were introduced through translation and educational missions abroad. Thus catching up with western societies came to be their chief social goal, rather than the modernist enterprise per se. In turn, this segment of society largely existed due to the self-interested desire of the central authority to benefit from western expertise. Furthermore, the inability of the proponents of modernization to fully assimilate the abstract ideals on which modernity was based rendered them unable to effectively critique the orthodox canon. Rather, they attempted to justify the modernist model through an enlightened reading of religion. They thus tried to graft this combination onto the existing social structure rather than replacing it altogether. Consequently, the break with tradition that defines modernity was not effected.
Subsequent to European military occupation, the fruits of the process of modernization began to materialize, whether this process was set in motion by top-down reforms, through the reproduction of the western model, or imposed by colonial hegemony over the power structure. We thus find ourselves before a modernized rather than a modern society. Some contend that since the process of modernization was set in motion as a result of external influences on internal development, the process distorted self-induced internal development and did not allow it to mature. The distortion accompanying the process of modernization is not solely attributable to internal factors. Rather, the process itself constitutes an impediment when it is implemented in a context of subjugation or dependency, called by some neo-patriarchy or dependent development (Hesham Sharaby, 40; Ahmed Zayed).
Against the background of the cultural movement, the transition to the twentieth century witnessed a number of social movements, the most prominent being the nationalist movement. This movement was an expression of bourgeoisie formations that evolved in the framework of capitalistic productive relations introduced in certain sectors to serve colonialist objectives. Later, however, the development of these relations was hindered by their alliance with colonial powers. A dichotomy thus arose between resistance and dependency and the nascent industrial sector was not allowed to evolve. The intervention of bourgeoisie elements and large merchants significantly contributed to its ineffectiveness. Moreover, the persistence of concepts associated with the sultanate within modernized, semi-despotic Arab states affected the ability of the political power center to effect socioeconomic change. This was reflected in the subordination of the economic elite to the central power, which, after much vacillation, settled into an alliance with the colonial powers. The central power was thus vicious towards the native masses and quite weak in the face of foreigners. The economic and agricultural failure that resulted from dismantling the traditional infrastructure led to a drastic deterioration in living conditions, and political figures failed to achieve the independence for which they had so long mobilized the masses. Furthermore, due to the failure to assimilate secularism—that is, the freedom to introduce political modernization—democracy, in the modern sense of the word, was never practiced in modern Arab societies. The same applies to the failure to reach a social consensus that supported severing ties with traditions and pursuing modernity (Samir Amin, 2003). Some explain this by claiming that traditions represented the only pleasure remaining to colonized nations (Abed El-Gabry).
The cultured elite, the educated, and the nationalists who supported the complete reproduction of the European model were torn between attempts to modernize tradition or “traditionalize” modernity. The conflict between the old and the new, tradition and modernity, and secularism and religion was thus never resolved. The elite were close to the masses in terms of their shared aspirations, but due to the patriarchal social system and its authoritarian, clientalist relations, the nationalist elite did not return the trust the masses had invested in them. At the same time, the nationalists did not command sufficient self-confidence to criticize the higher classes that dominated the social system. Thus, the cultured elite at times turned to the West and foreigners, while at others focused on influential elements among the ruling elite hoping to effect change through them. In so doing, they acquired the same weaknesses. Today’s social elite in the Arab world has inherited these same basic features from nineteenth-century proponents of modernization, as we shall later show.
As for the masses, they linked their interests with the nationalist cause. Due to the still undeveloped concept of class among workers and peasants, the nationalist conflict meshed with the social conflict to distort class consciousness. As a result, workers and peasants ceded leadership to the petit bourgeoisie out of nationalist considerations. Social and popular movements adopted prevalent modes of political action, working through the power structure to pressure it and direct it towards comprehensive change through piecemeal alterations of its policies and structure—in other words, they worked to change the existing framework from within (Tarek El-Beshery, 546). Against this background, social movements arose devoted to realizing change, the most important of which were the cultural renaissance movement, the Islamic resurgence movement, the national movement, and the women’s movement.

Post-independence states: social movements in crisis
After liberation movements achieved their objective of independence, a new type of state was established in the region, known as independence states. Whereas the pre-independence era was characterized by weak social and political forces, liberation movements and independence states represented an escape from the crisis of rule and economic development. The desire for independence thus coincided with the creation of the modern state. As a result, state priorities focused on reinforcing independence and cementing the state as the symbol of national identity and unity, while at the same time promoting economic and social development to overcome backwardness and accommodate the needs and aspirations of those social segments that were mobilized in the struggle for independence.
In pursuit of this target, nations favored the strict centralization of power, seen as the means to maintain independence, confront external challenges, contain domestic social and class cleavages, and reduce sources of conflict. The ruling elite (composed of technocrats, high civil servants, and military and nationalist elements) believed that the key to overcoming historical backwardness lay in economic structures and building an industrialized, nationalized economy. This required a centralized state to plan the modernization of the society and mobilize the public to effect radical changes in a very short period of time. Democracy, therefore, was not in the interest of the ruling elite. Thus, building the state was given priority over building democracy, and unity was favored over pluralism. This ultimately degenerated into an authoritarian state covetous of its autocratic power (Ali Aoumleel; Saad El-Din Ibrahim, 175-176). Constitutions in most Arab countries secured autocratic rule based on the imbalance of powers, favoring the executive and centralizing power in the hands of the president. In addition, social and economic institutions were weak and had limited effectiveness, especially considering the role played by the military elite (Amany Kandil: 184-186). This only strengthened the patriarchal system in the economic and political sphere and cemented the personalization of power, though the degree to which the masses benefited from this system varied.
The independence states launched agricultural reforms with the aim of achieving the capital investment required for industrialization and the expansion of infrastructure and education, and they relied on the strategy of import substitution and central planning. Although industrialization and development were successful in the early years, due to the continued implementation of these policies, crises began to erode the real achievements made. Financing became a problem. In turn, the state either tried to fund the deficit through inflation, which led to price rises, or to cut back on public expenditure by lowering the quality of services, which lowered the standard of living, or it borrowed, which only added the problem of servicing the debt. The shock of military defeat only reinforced the systematic erosion of the state’s popular legitimacy, for the population witnessed neither development nor independence. Opposition thus emerged in the form of social movements, whether student, labor, or democracy movements. As Samir Amin argues, the bourgeoisie enterprise, given dependent development, had demonstrated that the independence on which it had relied to legitimize its dictatorship, was impossible (Samir Amin, 1991: 136). In the face of such crises, many countries sought an alliance with the West and were impelled to implement the neo-liberal policies dictated by international donor institutions. In turn, this new alliance and these new policies necessitated a new form of legitimacy based on political liberalism. This form emerged under the influence of the patriarchal tradition and centralized authority, and the rising concern of broad segments of the population whose interests were jeopardized by the new policies. Nevertheless, these states continued to derive their legitimacy from traditions, particularly Islamic, monarchical, and tribal traditions (Samir Amin, 2003).
With the growing turn towards a market economy, privatization saw the sale of a significant sector of state enterprises and the expansion of the private sector, initially and notably in contracting, followed by the banking and service sectors and, to a lesser degree, agriculture and light industry. The private sector also started obtaining franchises for foreign companies, particularly multinationals. This rapid expansion was associated with parasitic practices, the most important being real estate speculation, forms of brokerage, and commissions, which occasioned the growth of the informal sector among the upper classes. Moreover, high-ranking civil servants, army officers, and security personnel started to covertly engage in private sector activity before retirement, whereupon they did so openly. Kinship relations strengthened the bond between the economic and political elite, and political power started to play a key role in economic activities. Termed by some speculative capitalism or unproductive capitalism, such economies give priority to distributional relations, giving rise to a distributional, rather than productive economy (Bourhan Ghelioun, 127; Saad El-Din Ibrahim, 275-277).
In addition to the relationship between business and politics, which already undermines the authenticity of liberalism in Arab societies, the economic elite in this kind of economy are not independent, since their existence depends on the direct or indirect services they offer to the global market. For them, the national market has become a means of to accumulate the capital necessary to become a part of global capitalism. The bourgeoisie world has been isolated from its surrounding environment, in which the majority lives in poverty with simple distribution patterns within a burgeoning informal economy. It is only logical that this class would not welcome democratic freedoms to accompany the economic freedoms to which they owe their very existence. Due to their dependence on external relations, they are not interested in finding a domestic social basis to endorse their liberal enterprise, but rely on pressures exerted by international institutions on the state. The alliance with foreign powers coupled with the creation of a despotic authority are the two primary reasons for the persistence of dependent capitalism despite continuous social opposition (Bourhan Ghaliouen, 128; Ali Omleel; Samir Amin, 2003).
The desire of Arab regimes to conform to the political systems of their western allies was accompanied by pressures exerted by those allies and debtor institutions to implement a form of democracy that aims to reduce the social and economic role of the state in the interest of the economic and cultural elite, which promotes the merits of the liberal enterprise and the inevitability of globalization. Of course, the restriction of the state role did not involve enlarging the sphere of opportunity for popular groups and organizations to affect political and economic decision-making in their interests, since this would contradict the enforced neo-liberal policies. In this context, political pluralism, especially in ostensibly democratic countries, was a gift from above that could be retracted if misused. The authoritarian nature of the state has thus persisted with a minor reorientation involving a shift from an absolutist form to a supervisory one (Amany Kandeel, 51). Indeed, political pluralism was accompanied by a huge step backwards in the direction of Mamluk autocratic systems, as the ability of popular forces to organize independently was severely curtailed (Samir Amin, 2003). A pertinent example is found in Egypt, where in the late 1970s a group of restrictive legislation—known locally as “the disreputable laws”—were issued, allowing life imprisonment for political cases. In addition, emergency law has become a permanent feature of the political landscape.
The authoritarian climate was one of the most important factors undermining other political and intellectual currents of thought. In addition, the crisis of liberalism intensified due to the absence of a social basis as a result of the nature of the economic elite. The crisis of the left also intensified with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In spite of increased security confrontations with various stripes of political Islam, some of these trends possessed political weight, which gave them considerable negotiation power. Political parties found a role within the game of politics, whose rules they did not set. With time, they became experienced in adjusting to the margins of opposition allowed to them, participating in parliaments that have no actual role in decision-making. There is also a notable similarity between the political regime and party practices: despite demands for freedom and the democratic practices enshrined in party regulations, the reality differs radically. Most party leaders, who have occupied their positions since the establishment of the parties, have consolidated the decision-making process in their own hands and restricted the participation of the base and intermediate levels (Amany Kandeel: 134). The role of the individual also appears clearly in his ability to facilitate operations and maintain lines of communication with the government.
Thus, elites of all kinds have realized that change only comes through the central power itself, and then only when dictated by external pressures. The strategy of change adopted by elites is thus an attempt to encroach upon the patriarchal system by provoking global public opinion and foreign centers of power. This was the path of resistance taken by leaders of NGOs, whose numbers increased dramatically in the 1990s due to the support of donor institutions and international organizations in the context of cementing the neo-liberal transformation.
Hence, the military-commercial autocratic model is very similar to the Mamluk comprador, rentier model (Samir Amin 2003). The triangle of the state, the opposition, and the superpowers is reminiscent of the eighteenth-century triangle embodying hierarchical dependency and patriarchal hegemony, wherein popular leaders pursued the interests of the masses by acting as intermediaries with the local authorities, attempting to pressure local authorities through appealing to the central Ottoman authorities who had appointed them. The question is whether social movements can go beyond this triangle and move towards change in a way that is consistent with the interests of the masses. This is the question we will attempt to address in the rest of the paper.

A survey of social movements in Arab societies
The advent of neo-liberalism in Arab societies raises several questions about the possibility of rectifying long-standing imbalances in the region, especially given the frequent occurrence of violence. Observers sense that the region is on the brink of change, although these changes are often difficult to measure or predict. Will political and social powers be content to play the role that was been defined for them? And will the popular masses be able to hold out much longer in the present conditions (Mohsen Marzouk)?

1. Labor movements
The attention that many countries devoted to industrialization in the post-independence period, with the objective of building a national economy, gave rise to a new working class that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from its peer in the pre-independence era. This shift has been reflected in labor movements. While colonization endowed the labor movement with a nationalist dimension, the existence of a nationalist state which acts as the largest employer left it own imprint on the debate between politics and economics, the partial and the comprehensive, and the relationship between the state and trade unions.
Arab countries adopted policies that granted some gains to workers while at the same time restricting their independence of action by other means, including governmental labor organization, legislation that constrains or bans the right to form independent organizations, the stripping of all means of resistance, and the use of the security system and violence if necessary. The obvious examples of this model are Syria and Egypt, although the policies had varying effects in each country. In Egypt, they led the labor leadership to attempt to escape from state hegemony, ultimately leading to the emergence of a labor movement outside the framework of the official union. In Syria, on the other hand, workers tended to exert pressure through the official union.
The post-independence big labor movements in Egypt began in 1968, operating not only outside the framework of the union but against the government itself. Despite the nationalist motif of the movement (bringing those responsible for the 1967 defeat to justice), the period after 1968 witnessed a strong workers’ economic struggle in which partial demands were connected with comprehensive ones. Public sector workers played a leading role in the movement since they had a heightened consciousness and many had come of age in communist movements in the 1940s. The workers’ negative views of the official union became obvious when union representatives were dismissed and workers refused to deal with the syndicate during a strike in Shoubra El-Kheima in 1975. In Syria, the workers’ union became a political syndicate after the rise of the Baath party in 1963 and its adoption of slogans that were in line with worker aspirations. The working class became a partner to the government insofar as it was responsible for failures and shortcomings, as well as some gains. The Union of Labor Syndicates still represents a major force due to pressures exercised from the workers base, its historical anti-transcapitalist discourse, its active participation in the International Union of Labor Syndicates, and the vitality of certain left-wing elements, such as Dr. Shebel Marzouk. Still, there are questions regarding the sustainability of this movement as the government takes further steps towards economic and political reform (Saber Barakat, Kamal Abbas, Moustafa Magdy El-Gamal, and Sawsan Zukzuk).
The Tunisian experience reflects a different relationship between the labor movement and the state. The absorption of the General Labor Union by the state exposed the movement to other political agents. Thus the movement was both an actor in the political system, even while it suffered from the contradictions inherent in the system. This paved the way for it to become a basic agent of change within society, irrespective of the extent to which it actually availed itself of the opportunity. This may be attributable to the nature of the Bourguiba regime, in which the political class supported the rotation of power, while in other countries the technocracy tended to be bound closely to the central political power. In the 1970s the Tunisian Labor Union acted as an umbrella for the most important opposition forces and represented the most powerful popular organization in the country, with branches in all major cities. This allowed the syndicate movements to impose a social program compatible with the interests of the popular masses and supportive of the democratization of state systems. Nonetheless, the involvement of Habib Ashour—the leader of the union at that time—in a struggle for succession to Bourguiba kept him from realizing his potential as he focused on his personal interests. In turn, conservative powers within the union favored certain confrontations for their own interests, which ultimately undermined the union and transformed it into a “a partnership syndicate” with the new government in 1987 (Mohhsen Marzouk).
Another vivid example is Sudan. The alternation between civil democratic rule and military rule led to rapid transformations in the syndicate and union systems. At times, it led the push for change through public revolt and insurrection, as in the 1964 revolution and the 1985 uprising, while at others it was forced to resort to covert operations, as was the case after 1970 during the Nemeiri administration (Othman Serag El Din).
The relationship between leftist political forces and the labor movement played a central role in the development of class consciousness, which politicized labor movements in most Arab countries. This aggravated the crisis of independence among labor activists and gave rise to factional differences, which undermined the natural cohesion of the labor movement. This was quite evident in Egypt. In Algeria, on the other hand, most leftist elements were francophone. This crisis coincided with the beginning of policies of structural adjustment, which put the working class on the defensive and debilitated it (Saber Barakat, Nasser Gaby).
These interactions revealed the patriarchal nature of Arab social institutions, which had implications for the relationship between the nationalist state and workers, embodied in the achievement of certain gains combined with a clampdown on independent action. It also allowed leftist forces to control the movement. Patriarchy further manifested itself in the significant roles played by the individual in determining the path and performance of an entire social movement. In the case of Tunisia, we are led to wonder about the extent to which President Bourguiba’s individualist policies changed the destiny of the labor movement and, indeed, the whole country. By imposing his control on the ruling party and the labor union, he consequently inspired a vicious, personal conflict over succession among labor movement leaders, which might have caused the movement to miss a historical opportunity.
As Arab regimes began to implement structural adjustment policies, a new form of the private sector emerged and workers were stripped of all the powers that the state had granted to syndicates when it had adopted socialist policies and the defense of workers’ rights. Consequently the labor movement was surrounded by four counter-forces. The first of these are employers, who come from a variety of classes and backgrounds and have various sources of wealth. As a whole, they tend to operate like contractors in the informal sector, paying little attention to laws or historical employer-employee relationships that might interfere with the drive for quick profits. They are also closely connected with the ruling party through kinship and networks of mutual interests (Ahmed Thabet, 2002). They are thus able to encroach on workers’ rights and put them in a vulnerable position. Secondly, governments are inclined to oppose independent labor movements since their interests are at odds with current policies, and labor movements are the most capable of stoking social resistance to these policies. Thirdly, labor movements have been affected by the status of their allies, particularly leftist forces, which played a historical role in the workers’ movement. It is thus logical that the current weakness of leftist forces, the erosion of their political power, and their limited influence on society have affected labor movements. The latter have both lost their ally and been afflicted by the same lethargy. Finally, the composition of the labor force was transformed due to structural adjustment and shifts in the economic activities of Arab states. For instance, the public sector labor force has declined dramatically while the private sector has grown. New elements have also joined the labor force, for example, workers in the new Egyptian industrial cities. As a result, the number of workers who made history through their struggle and developed a highly tuned nationalist consciousness has declined, to be replaced by workers who, having been raised on consumerist values, have no links with the labor movement and its ideals. This is in addition to laborers who work without any legal protection in the informal sector, which often affects their capacity for unification and solidarity (Kamal Abbas).
This fourfold encroachment has paralyzed the labor movement and turned it into a number of disconnected, scattered protests, largely of a random, transient nature. This raises gravely important questions for those concerned with labor affairs. The first is related to the democratization of movement’s structure and the limits of working through official unions or attempting to increase the number of syndicates. Thus, while many Egyptian labor activists hope that increasing syndicate centers will free the labor movement—and indeed, they have tried to establish independent organizations within the official union—the government’s keenness to dominate the Union of Labor Syndicates has kept them from realizing their goal (Saber Barakat). In Algeria, the plurality of syndicates has not helped the labor movement move beyond its defensive position, since these syndicates were created as the movement was experiencing a state of extreme weakness. Another important issue to consider is the potential for communication and the transmission of expertise among different generations of labor activists. Finally, we must also consider the relationship of political powers and intellectuals to the working class movement, discovering a way to resolve this complex equation to engender solidarity and an independent leadership for the labor movement. This is related to another problem, which involves disentangling the political and economic dimensions of the labor movement.
Recently some groups have emerged that bring together labor activists, historical labor leaders, and NGOs. For the most part, these groups focus on defending labor interests that have been eroded due to the implementation of neo-liberal policies. Most of these groups in Arab countries cooperate and coordinate activities (for example, between Egypt and Algeria). Their activities center on convening seminars; preparing information sheets, bulletins and promotional materials; and offering alternative formulations for labor laws. Although these groups have been quite active recently, their activities are always dependent on the moods of the influential intellectuals and rights’ activists involved in them, and they are constrained by the narrow democratic margin allowed for such activities, particularly by the labor movement.

2. Peasant movements
In the post-independence era, the majority of Arab countries implemented agricultural reform programs as part of a nationalist, bourgeoisie enterprise that sought to eradicate the economic, political, and social influence of large landowners and achieve a surplus that could be used to industrialize. Immediately following the July revolution in Egypt, the state passed a series of agriculture reform laws in September 1952. The laws set a maximum limit on agricultural land ownership, and redistributed some lands among small farmers. This law, however, only affected 7% of agricultural land, which was redistributed to only 5% of households working in agriculture.
In this period in Egypt, a peasant movement emerged to resist the smuggling of excess land by large landowners and to confront the attempts of the affluent in rural areas to control land. Many confrontations took place between peasants and large landowning families, and these left several victims in their wake, including Salah Hussein, Dessouki Ahmed Ali, and Abdel Hamid Ghandour. The bureaucratic administrative authorities then conspired with large landowners and agents of the Socialist Union to eat away at the small gains made by farmers. The cooperatives, dispute resolution committees, and local committees were turned into institutions tailored to serve their interests. From 1960 through 1965, the government appropriated approximately 11% of the agricultural surplus. As the development process stumbled in the 1960s and with the advent of the Open Door Policy, village banks started to replace the cooperatives in 1976. Credit, given at high interest rates, became a burden on farmers and led to a deterioration in living conditions. This spurred emigration from villages to cities and to the oil countries of the Gulf.
The implementation of neo-liberal policies was associated with the enactment of a law in 1992 that freed rents on agricultural land and stripped tenant farmers of their rights. Landlords were thus given the freedom to set the rental value and the tenure of the contract. As a result of this law, many tenant farmers lost their land and joined the agricultural or manual labor force. Liberalization policies were also responsible for the abolition of subsidies on agricultural inputs, the liberalization of interest rates on agricultural loans, and the abolition of tax exemptions for small landowners. This allowed the import-export mafia and monopolistic forces to dominate the agricultural sphere, which led to an increase in rural unemployment and the deterioration of conditions for agricultural labor. Thus, the relationship between impoverished peasants, on one hand, and the state and large landowners, on the other hand, became one of conflict. Small landowners now constitute 95.8% of the owners and possess 50% of the land, while 45% of landowners own 30% of the land, and 0.2% of landowners own 15%.
To resist these conditions the Peasants’ Union was established in 1983 within the nationalist, progressive Tagammu Party. Research centers, NGOs, and political parties have also started devoting attention to farmers’ concerns. Their demands can be summarized as follows: the revival of the central cooperative union as a body capable of playing a real role in the service of farmers’ interests, the establishment of a cooperative bank to serve farmers, the formulation of responses to agreements concluded with the World Bank and USAID, and a resistance to normalization with Israel.
The peasant resistance movement began in the 1990s by sending complaints to officials and the press. It then proceeded to collect thousands of signatures from wronged tenant farmers and convened approximately 200 peasant conferences, largely organized by opposition parties. The movement then moved on to public demonstrations and sit-ins in front of the cooperative headquarters. Since late 1996, movements aiming at the repeal of the agricultural rental law have expanded to various parts of rural Egypt. The law has been acutely felt since it first came into operation in 1997, a year that witnessed several bouts of violence.
Other factors, however, have helped allay the tension and have facilitated farmers’ acclimatization to the new law. Some farmers were unaware of the impact the law would have on their income, while at the same time certain compromises were reached between tenants and landowners. Moreover, there has been a virtual press blackout of peasant movements. Despite disagreement among analysts about the size, effectiveness, and sustainability of these movements, they agree that they are an expression of the desires of impoverished peasants, especially agricultural laborers (Hanan Mady).
In Sudan the first general union for Sudanese peasants was formed under the military regime of May 1967, though it was preceded by the peasant union led by prominent communist leader Muhammad Amin before independence. The first general union was founded to represent peasants in the Socialist Union, Sudan’s sole political organization. Accordingly, its role of serving peasant interests did not come to fruition. The general union was composed of regional unions and unions for agricultural irrigation projects in Sudan. With the ascension of the current government in 1992, the union was opened up to farmers all over Sudan. It had a direct membership of 560 members representing Sudan’s various provinces in accordance with agricultural density.
Farmers in Sudan suffered from the drop in crop prices set by the government. This led many to give up farming and immigrate to Khartoum. Agricultural enterprises were also privatized in 1992. A total of 20 agricultural institutions were sold off and 492 of 2,229 workers were laid off. The peasant union was unable to do anything.

3. Intellectual movements within the framework of national protest and democratic demands
In most Arab societies, the nationalist state tried to absorb intellectuals into state institutions after gaining independence. Initially this was accomplished through the state’s exploitation of nationalist sentiment and its appeal to intellectuals. The state also made much of the opportunities for creativity and innovation within state institutions. Since the arena for independent political action was narrowed, intellectuals were absorbed in official press institutions and writers’ and artists’ unions within the framework of the nationalist enterprise, while at the same time maintaining their various political persuasions.
As nationalism waned, many Arab nations began allying themselves with the West and, in some cases, normalizing relations with Israel. This coincided with the decision of many governments to institute various forms of pluralism. In the face of an official climate undisposed towards nationalist issues; the increased political, cultural, and military influence of the West; growing socioeconomic crises that were manifested in deteriorated living standards; the merely formal nature of pluralism and democracy; and the incapacity of political parties to absorb intellectuals, intellectuals began pursuing various activities to express their opposition to existing policies. These activities embraced intellectuals of all political stripes—leftist, liberal, and Islamist—but they were united by their nationalist concerns and their demands for democracy. The resistance took many forms, largely collective, such as national committees, committees within professional syndicates, and research centers, in addition to forms of individual expression and the opposition press. Intellectuals used various means, including writing, convening conferences and seminars, and organizing public campaigns.
Most of these groups were advocacy groups with of nationalist, democratic persuasion. Issues that came under their purvey included resisting normalization with Israel; supporting the Palestinian uprising and the Iraqi people; preserving the cultural heritage; combating corruption; opposing the Open Door policy, privatization, and the devastating effects of Arab dependency; confronting the threat posed by the United States and Israel to Arab countries on the intellectual, economic, and military fronts; and addressing the crisis of the freedom in the Arab world (Muhammad Ismail). Initially, democracy was not a demand in and of itself, but the issue was raised in the context of the struggle with the state over other demands, largely nationalist in nature. This indicates that authoritarianism may be acceptable if it is exercised by a nationalist regime (Samir Amin, 2003).
In Egypt, there are several examples of this form of popular resistance: the Committee to Defend National Culture (1979), the Popular Movement to Resist Zionism and Boycott Israel (1996), the Egyptian Popular Committee to Break the Siege on Iraq (1998), the National Committee for Egyptian University Faculty to Confront Zionism (2000), the Popular Committee to Support the Palestinian Uprising (2000), and the Egyptian Committee to Defend Freedoms (1997). Other ad hoc committees were created for specific occasions, such as labor strikes (the committee to defend the rights of railway workers in 1985 and the committee to defend the rights of iron and steel industry workers in 1989), or other nationalist events (the committee to defend Soliman Khater*) (Muhammad Ismail).
In Syria, the Arab Writers’ Union was established in 1969 by presidential decree. It brought together writers from different political backgrounds with three main principles: nationalism, commitment, and progressiveness. Yet, the union could not accommodate the intellectuals’ movement since the appointment of the leadership and the president was a political decision. Despite their various political backgrounds, intellectuals sought to express their nationalist concerns and democratic demands in a clearer way by forming forums, such as the Riyadh Seif Forum or the Forum for Cultural Dialogue. The Committee to Revitalize Civil Society held its first meeting in 2000. Other committees were also formed, including the National Committee to Boycott Imperialist Commodities and Interests, and the Palestine Support Group and the Iraq Support Group, both established as a response to recent events (Sawsan Zukzuk).
In Sudan, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed intensive cultural activities on the part of writers, especially in opposition to the November 1958 regime and the May 1969 regime. These activities were largely socialist in character, and they were directed against both old and new forms of imperialism. The intellectual movement thus emerged within the framework of the literary salon and the Ghaba and Sahara movements, two intellectual currents concerned with the examination of Sudanese identity. In addition, civil activities took place in clubs and intellectual centers, particularly clubs for workers and university graduates, and the League of Khartoum University Writers emerged. The idea of forming a writers’ and artists’ union was brought up in 1970 and 1975, but the idea only came to fruition in the aftermath of the 1985 uprising. Unfortunately, the union was dissolved and its property was confiscated after the establishment of the Salvation Government in 1989 (Othman Serag El-Din ).
It is noteworthy that nationalist intellectual movements emerged within other social movements. This is attributable to a number of factors, including the long history of nationalist demands, which continued to be relevant concerns given state dependence on new capitalist centers under neo-colonialism or the Israeli occupation and settlement of a considerable part of Arab territory and the threat it poses. Moreover, nationalist concerns united various political groups, social movements, and NGOs. Indeed, nationalist issues and causes were the only issues that inspired collective action that brought together activists as well as the normally inactive masses.
Nevertheless, we have several remarks regarding the size, membership, and sustainability of these types of action. Many of these groups have only a limited membership that does not increase with time, and, indeed, many enjoy a common membership. This means that the same people are pursuing similar activities in diverse committees. Thus, the plethora of popular committees cannot be taken as an indication of the number of activists. Moreover, these groups often operate only on a temporary basis, often freezing activities for an unspecified period of time. Their shared membership is attributable in part to the activities of opposition political parties, which compete with them and seek to consolidate political power within these forms of resistance. Alternatively, it might be due to personality conflicts within these popular organizations. Since these forms of popular resistance often involve links to parties or the involvement of influential public figures, they tend to seek a balance with the state by limiting their activities when necessary or refusing to cross certain lines.
These committees and groups have witnessed a period of intense activity in the 1990s, particularly in the last three years. The intensification of Israeli and U.S. aggression against Arab peoples has stoked resentment and outrage, particularly given the abysmal living conditions in the Arab world and successive social and economic crises. Anti-American sentiment, support for Iraq and Palestine, and the anti-war demonstrations are vivid embodiments of this resentment. The harsh measures used by police to quell demonstrations in Egypt can be used to gauge the potential range and power of the popular movement if it were allowed to operate in a democratic climate. Ultimately, however, intellectuals, along with other popular groups, can only function within the narrow margin allotted to them, while the state can only work to keep this margin as small as possible.

4. Advocacy organizations and NGOs
Upon gaining independence, most Arab regimes dissolved existing NGOs and enacted new laws to establish associations subsidiary to the Ministry of Social Affairs. These new associations worked in service-delivery and charitable activities (NGOs) or in mobilizing segments of society within the framework of nationalist politics and a singular, ruling political organization (i.e., the Revolutionary Youth, the General Feminist Union in Syria, and the Youth Organization in Cairo). Most of these associations represented governmental agencies or organizations, and, as a result, they were afflicted with the same bureaucratic nature and ineffectiveness. With the change in political orientation, the budding alliance between Arab regimes and western nations, and the shift in the official discourse towards liberalism, new forms of official and semi-official activities were seen in human and women’s rights, both fields that witnessed much activity on the global level. At the same time, democratic associations began to emerge operating in these fields. The ideological roots of these organizations derived predominantly from democratic ideals, due to the involvement of elements that had been denied access to political parties and thereby sought different forms of popular activism, whether out despair with current political practices or as an attempt to exploit the margins of pluralism. These organization became known as advocacy or rights groups to distinguish them from the large number of charitable NGOs known historically.
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, a momentous transformation took place. NGOs of different orientations were established, but, in keeping with the new international climate, these were primarily advocacy organizations. As foreign financing of NGOs increased in the early 1990s, many NGOs were established, and debates began to rage over human rights, women’s rights, and the environment, as well as about the relationship between the foreign and the domestic, the local and the global, and the political and the social. These debates continue even in the present day (Yousri Moustafa). The adoption of an internationally prevalent advocacy-centered politics fed to varying degrees Islamist and leftist trends, especially the latter, which has recently been suffering a crisis of origins.
The international context has thus played a conspicuous role in supporting and reinforcing the existence of the new advocacy organizations. At the same time, NGOs in the Arab world have suffered from some degree of discrimination. Some NGOs continue to represent certain popular strata, and they have made it a point to receive funding from foreign organizations with the same or similar orientation that are opposed to neo-liberalism. Most organizations, however, sought merely to maintain a presence, which was initially impossible except through funding from international organizations or agencies affiliated with the West. They have therefore become inextricably linked to neo-liberalism and can be used by the West to exploit human rights issues for political purposes. Since many elements that established NGOs were earlier engaged in political activities, these organizations have been divided into leftist, nationalist or Nasserist, and Islamist, of which the latter has best preserved their influence and hegemony.
These NGOs used the influence of western and international organizations to create a margin for conflict with existing regimes. At times, this margin has been expanded due to the desire of some regimes to cultivate a democratic image. In addition, their subordination to the West (especially the U.S.) has also increased this margin, since western financial aid is often conditional on the implementation of certain policies, such as the legalization of NGOs. At other times, however, the margin for conflict has shrunk due to the state’s insistence on retaining all authority and preventing the emergence of independent centers for change. Governments in the region have also resorted to direct supervision of all foreign funding for local NGOs. By overseeing the funding process, the state is able to select NGOs to receive funding based on the degree to which they deviate from official discourse, their degree of support for state policies, and their popular base. Arab regimes also maintain control via the selective implementation of existing laws, which ultimately grant them full control.
In Egypt, a feminist organization headed by Nawal El-Sadawi was closed down due to its political discourse and relatively popular support base. In addition, the secretary-general of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights was detained by the state security prosecutor in 1998 for crossing a red line when the organization addressed the issue of Copts’ rights and a case of collective torture in the Upper Egyptian village of El-Kosheh. This was deemed to be foreign intervention in Egyptian domestic policies (Yousri Moustafa). Furthermore, governments have consistently tightened laws that regulate the activity of NGOs, as is the case with Law 153/1999 in Egypt. Nonetheless, these organizations, in their conflict with the state, have never turned to the grassroots elements they supposedly target. Rather, they have depended on international pressure on local regimes. Thus, while NGOs are not directly dependent on government policy, they are dependent on funding if they wish to exist. They thus function within a sphere allotted to them by the local government and their western allies, and they do not cross certain red lines set by the state.
Most NGOs have clung firmly to an elitist discourse, reinforced by their official censure and accusations of working for the West, through which the state aims to contain them culturally and politically by using nationalist propaganda that is at odds with the official discourse. NGOs themselves are responsible as well, since their discourse is alien to the cultural context in which they work, at times never departing from the monotony of discourse used by UN organizations. Finally, political powers, and particularly political parties, have accused NGOs of working for the West and of elitism, although parties suffer from this latter problem as well. In Lebanon, sectarian forces were able to seize control of social work and use it to serve their own interests (Abdullah Mohey El-Din).
Studies indicate that these organizations witnessed the entrance of a new generation of professionals more closely bound to the global NGO framework. In general, this generation does not interact with the organization’s sphere of interest except in their professional capacity, especially since the income from these jobs guarantees a considerable social boost. Consequently, they are unqualified to bear the political burdens of this sort of activity. In addition, NGOs are not administered democratically, which makes them resemble an organization of employees rather than one of professionals (Yousri Moustafa). As individuals play a singular role in facilitating the activities of the organizations—the influence of key individuals increases as they create an extensive network of relationships that allow them to obtain funds and find outlets for publicity—these NGOs do not differ from the patriarchal model prevalent in political culture and social relations.
Recently, in the context of the deterioration of living standards, heightened nationalist sentiment, and a new political momentum inveighing against neo-liberalism in light of hostility to the West and the U.S., a number of organizations have emerged to defend economic and social rights like housing, child rights, etc. In addition, some human rights NGOs that defend political and civil liberties began to get involved in anti-Zionist activities, especially in the global conference against racism that was convened in 2001 in Johannesburg (Yousri Moustafa).
NGOs vary in their stance towards neo-liberal globalization. Organizations working in labor and peasant rights, economic and social rights, and environmental issues have begun to engage in activities opposed to neo-liberalism, for example anti-globalization demonstrations in Europe and the U.S. Human rights organizations, particularly civil and political, are the least involved in this respect, since their agenda does not include anti-globalization.
In Syria, the liberal margin has not yet led to greater political pluralism or diversity in the forms of public action. Thus, the relationship between NGOs and the state is different. The establishment of committees for the defense of human rights began in 1989, and several appeals have been made to release political prisoners, allow greater public freedoms, and apply the constitution. Only one annual report was issued on the status of human rights in Syria before the government cracked down on democratization activities in 1991. Activities picked up again in 1998, and a committee working in human rights has participated in several international and Arab conferences. In the context of the forum movement, a cultural forum, a human rights forum, and a forum for the revitalization of civil society were established in 2000, but these were later suspended when the forums were prohibited. In 2001, a human rights association was established in Syria, but it was not given a license. A number of committees have also been formed, the most important of which are the Committee for the Families of Political Detainees and the Committee for Study and Research

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Auteur: Azza Abd al-Mohsen Khalil